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Introduction 
 
The exchange rate models that emerged in response to the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods fixed-parity system in the early 1970s are without exception based on the 
notion of rational expectations (Muth, 1961) and a representative agent. It is 
increasingly evident, however, that traditional exchange rate modeling based on the 
efficient market rational expectations paradigm is rejected by the data.1 Several 
empirical anomalies have been uncovered over the years. One of the most widely 
stated empirical anomaly relates to the existence of the exchange rate disconnect 
puzzle, i.e. the exchange rate appears to be disconnected from its underlying 
fundamental process. For instance, the findings of Goodhart (1989) and more recently 
Faust et al (2003) contradict the efficient market rational expectations model, which 
implies that the majority of changes in exchange rates occurs when there is no 
observable news in the fundamentals. Other anomalies relate to the existence of 
excess volatility, fat tails of the distribution of exchange rate returns and volatility 
clustering (Flood and Rose, 1995; de Vries, 2001; Lux and Marchesi, 2000).  
Guided by this evidence, which was difficult to rationalize in existing 
exchange rate models, three different modeling approaches of the exchange rate have 
emerged. The first one uses the Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995, 1996) REDUX framework of 
dynamic utility optimization of a representative agent. These micro-founded macro 
models assume rational expectations, but are more thorough in the micro foundation 
compared to the former exchange rate models. A second approach highlights the 
importance of the market microstructure theory in explaining the complex short-term 
behavior of the exchange rate (Evans and Lyons, 2002). Using order flow as a 
proximate determinant, they develop a model that is strikingly successful in 
accounting for realized exchange rate changes. In their analyses, they show that the 
order flow conveys dispersed information and that the distribution of information is 
an important determinant in short-run exchange rate movements. Moreover, the large 
volumes in the exchange rate market are explanatory for short-term movements and 
an indication that agents have different information or process information differently. 
As shown by Fan and Lyons (2001), informative trades are mixed with uninformative 
trades, indicating that market efficiency crucially depends on how markets accomplish 
                                                
1
 Well-known examples of the rational expectations efficient market model is the monetary model, the 
Dornbusch model (Dornbusch, 1976) and the portfolio balance model. 
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the difficult task of aggregating dispersed information. Finally, a third approach 
recognizes that heterogeneous agents have different and changing beliefs about the 
behavior of the exchange rate, thereby introducing non-linear features in the dynamics 
of the exchange rate. This approach was initiated by Frankel and Froot (1987) and 
further developed in the context of financial asset pricing. For instance, Brock and 
Hommes (1997, 1998) model trader-heterogeneity in a dynamic heterogeneous agents 
model with trader interaction and switching believes. Their approach differs from the 
fundamental models in that it explicitly models different types of boundedly rational 
behavior. 
The third insight highlights the role of the heterogeneity of economic agents’ 
expectations and seems promising in explaining the dynamics of asset prices, 
including the exchange rate (see de Long et al., 1990; Frankel and Froot, 1987; Brock 
and Hommes, 1998; Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Hommes, 2000). For instance, 
heterogeneous agent models are able to replicate the characteristics of exchange rate 
returns; volatility clustering, fat tails of the distribution of returns and the absence of 
first-moment predictability and long-run mean reversion are replicated by De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). Verification of the heterogeneous agent models, however, 
has only been done by either simulations or analytical derivations - both methods are 
elaborately presented in De Grauwe et al. (2004). The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows us to study the mechanics of the model in a purely deterministic way; it 
gives a clear view on the effect of the mechanisms in the model. The disadvantage, 
however, is that the model is not directly confronted with real-life financial data. It is 
therefore not certain whether the mechanisms formally described in the heterogeneous 
agent models are actually present in the dynamics of financial markets, despite the 
fact that the models are capable of reproducing the characteristics observed in 
exchange markets. 
Although the heterogeneity of agents approach is intellectually satisfying, the 
heterogeneity model has hardly been estimated with empirical financial data because 
of the non-linear nature of the model that (mainly) arises from the existence of the 
mechanism that governs the switching between beliefs. Recently this issue has been 
explored either directly or indirectly by a number of papers. As an early example, 
Shiller (1984) introduces a model with rational smart money traders and ordinary 
investors and shows that the proportion of smart money traders varies considerably 
during the 1900-1983 period by assuming the effect of ordinary investors to be zero. 
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Vigfusson (1997) and Ahrens and Reitz (2005) have circumvented the problem of the 
non-linear switching mechanism by replacing it by a Markov regime-switching 
approach. Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) find significant evidence of agent 
heterogeneity in the beef market by applying a Kalman-filter approach. Winker and 
Gilli (2001) estimate a heterogeneous agent model indirectly by minimizing a loss 
function consisting of the kurtosis and ARCH-estimates of the simulated data by 
adjusting the coefficients of the model. Reitz and Westerhoff (2003, 2006) estimate a 
model of chartists and fundamentalists with switching mechanism for exchange rates 
by assuming the weight of technical traders to be constant and the weight of 
fundamental traders to depend on the misalignment between the market and 
fundamental price. Boswijk et al. (2006) is the only example, to our best knowledge, 
that fully and directly estimates a heterogeneous agents model with switching 
mechanism; they simplify and rewrite the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and 
estimate it for the S&P500. Overall, the majority of the empirical studies finds 
evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agents models; both trader heterogeneity and 
switching believes are found. 
This paper explores the relevance of the heterogeneity of agents’ expectations, 
who use incomplete information and who have different beliefs about the future 
exchange rate. Our approach uses simple expectation formation rules, which form the 
asset price forming mechanism. The “fitness” of the rules is controlled ex-post by 
checking their risk-adjusted profitability; agents can switch to the more profitable 
rule. We extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2006) by estimating the heterogeneous 
agent model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) for the European Monetary 
System (EMS) exchange rates. Unlike previous foreign exchange rate studies, we 
avoid the problems of defining the ‘true’ fundamental exchange rate, on which there 
is no consensus in the literature and which may also change over time during a 
floating rate period (Manzan and Westerhoff, 2005). By using the central ‘parity’ rate 
as the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the EMS-period, from March 1979 
until December 1998. The EMS was literally an exchange rate target zone with 
narrow bands, such that there are movements in the exchange rate2, but still we have 
an observable “fundamental.”  
                                                
2
 Unlike the case of a fixed rate regime. 
 - 5 - 
Note that the intuition behind the heterogeneity model changes somewhat.3 
Mean reversion does not necessarily have to be interpreted as fundamentalism, but as 
confidence in the target zone regime.4 True fundamentalists can also expect the 
exchange rate to move away from parity if they believe the central rate is not accurate 
and the exchange rate will move towards the actual economics based fundamental rate 
as perceived by traders. In this paper, we simply define fundamentalists as agents who 
condition their expectations on the central parity, irrespective of whether they are 
stabilizing or destabilizing for the target zone regime. Chartists, or technical analysts, 
in contrast, base their expectation on past returns. Furthermore, the behavior of market 
participants can be dependent on the position of the market rate in the band, 
comparable to the S-curve of Krugman (1991). Initially destabilizing chartists who 
believe the regime is credible might become stabilizing or revise their coefficients as 
the exchange rate gets close to the upper or lower band. In addition, the 
fundamentalists’ expectation of mean-reversion might get stronger as the exchange 
rate moves closer to the band if they expect Central Bank interventions. Thus, mean 
reversion can be stronger if the expected gain is larger, so if the exchange rate is close 
to the band and the regime is credible, and vice versa. 
 The current study complements previous studies and makes several new 
contributions. Using a sample of eight EMS exchange rates for the period from March 
1979 to December 1998, we find strong evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agent 
model. For seven countries, we find significant evidence of heterogeneous 
expectations; significant switching of believes is found for only two countries, but 
switching is significantly beneficial for the explanatory power of the model in seven 
cases. In addition, we show that the heterogeneous agent model outperforms the 
random walk in out-of-sample forecasting in all country/period combinations. Finally, 
we find that the limit behavior of the model for the total sample is generally stable, 
while it differs considerably per country and period for sub samples. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 
three building blocks of the heterogeneous agent model, while Section 2 presents the 
methodology to empirically estimate the model. In Section 3 the estimation results are 
reported. In addition, Section 4 presents the forecasting ability of the model. Section 5 
                                                
3
 An important feature of fixed exchange rate regimes is that parities are usually imperfectly credible 
and not permanent. 
4
 The EMS exchange rate mechanism could very well lead to mean reversion in bilateral EMS 
exchange rates if the system succeeds in maintaining longer-run targets rates or central rates. 
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discusses the deterministic behavior of our model, in particular the stability and type 
of limit behavior if we iterate the model forward. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
1. The model 
 
In this Section, we use a simple non-linear model of the exchange rate, which is very 
close to the approach proposed by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). They 
model the exchange rate as a financial asset, while using the macro-economic 
fundamentals as an exogenous variable. The model consists of three building blocks. 
First agents decide on the optimal portfolio in a mean variance utility framework 
using simple expectations formation rules concerning the future exchange rate. 
Second, the actual exchange rate is formed by the weighted average of heterogeneous 
expectations and, third, the simple rules are evaluated ex-post by comparing their risk-
adjusted profitability. The following step consists of choosing a forecasting rule for 
the next cycle, based on past performance. We assume different types of agents, 
which we will call fundamentalists and chartists.5 
 
1.1. The investment decision 
 
 We assume agents of different types i depending on their beliefs about the 
future exchange rate. Each agent of type i can invest in two assets, a domestic and a 
foreign one, and maximizes mean-variance utility given by the following equation: 
 
 )(
2
1)()( 111 ititititit WVWEWU +++ −= µ ,        (1) 
 
                                                
5
 Note that the chartists do not take into account information concerning the fundamental exchange rate 
and can be considered as pure noise traders (see De Long et al., 1990). For evidence that Chartism is 
used widely to make forecasts see Cheung et al., 1999 and Taylor and Allen, 1992. Neely and Weller 
(1999) show that this is also the case for the EMS period. 
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 where itW 1+  represents wealth of agent i in period t+1, E is the expectations 
operator of agent of type i,  is the coefficient of risk aversion and )( 1itit WV + represents 
conditional volatility of wealth of agent i in period t+1. 
Agents can distribute their wealth between assets in the home country and 
assets in the foreign country; both pay a fixed rent. Next period’s wealth is therefore 
equal to 
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where i and i* represent home and foreign interest rates, st+1 is the exchange 
rate in period t+1 and di,t is the amount of wealth invested abroad, denoted in foreign 
currency. Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of Equation 2 represents the value 
of the foreign portfolio in domestic currency at time t+1, while the second term 
represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time t+1. Next period wealth is 
dependent on the rates of return of the assets and the appreciation of the foreign 
currency. The investment decision is taken by choosing that amount of foreign assets 
di,t that maximizes Equation (1). The optimal amount is found by substituting 
Equation (2) into (1) and maximizing with respect to di,t. The optimal amount of 
wealth invested abroad for investor type i becomes: 
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 where )()1( 12*2 ++= ttt sViσ . The amount of wealth invested abroad *,tid  is thus 
dependent on the home and foreign interest rates, combined with both the 
heterogeneous beliefs about the future level of the exchange rate and its variance. 
Total market demand for foreign assets at time t is equal to the sum of 
individual demands, i.e.: 
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 where H is the number of different forecasting strategies, ni,t is the number of 
agents of type i in period t and Dt is total demand for the foreign asset. Market 
equilibrium implies that market demand is equal to market supply Xt, which we 
assume to be exogenous. Thus, 
 
  tt DX =          (5) 
 
 where Xt is the exogenous supply of foreign assets. For simplicity we assume 
the supply of foreign assets exogenous and constant; without loss of generality we can 
put Xt=0. 
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the 
market equilibrium equation and solving for the exchange rate st yields the market 
clearing exchange rate: 
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,
,
 is the weight of agent of type i. Note that the current 
exchange rate is a function of expected future exchange rates. A way of interpreting 
this is that there is a Walrasian auctioneer; investors trade using market orders. At the 
beginning of the period, they choose their optimal demand of the risky asset to submit 
to the market maker. At the end of period t, the market maker fixes the equilibrium 
exchange rate st that clears the market. The exchange rate is therefore always in 
equilibrium. 
 
1.2. Which strategy? 
 
 The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the fitness of 
the strategy they are using. We assume that agents use one of three rules, compare 
their (risk adjusted) profitability ex-post and then decide whether to keep the rule or 
switch to another one. Note that this is a boundedly rational setup. The model 
represents a complex non-linear world, such that expectations cannot be unbiased 
 - 9 - 
without infinitely accurate estimates of the coefficients and starting values of the 
model. The bounded rationality therefore does not come forward in non-accurate 
expectations, but lies in the fact that agents do not use all available information in 
forming expectations, while they do have costless access to that information. For 
example, agents know the expectations formed by both strategies because they 
compare profits. However, they do not take into account the existence of other agents 
when forming expectations, thus do not use all available information. The bounded 
rationality also shows from the fact that not all agents change strategy immediately 
once a certain strategy performs better than the other does in a given period. The 
number of agents using a given strategy evolves gradually over time, conditional on 
relative performance. On the other hand, agents do condition the choice of their 
expectation rule on past performance, which is relevant for maximizing utility. In 
addition, chartists are not showing herding behavior because the choice of expectation 
rule is not directly conditional on what other agents do, but on best forecasting 
performance.6  
This specification is more appropriate than the representative rational agent 
model since the hypothesis of rationality is rejected in all tests on survey expectations 
(see e.g. Cavaglia et al., 1993). Furthermore, introducing mutual conditioning in 
expectation formation creates the phenomenon of "infinite regress" (Townsend, 
1983), i.e. the exchange rate depends on the expectations of other agents’ 
expectations, which depends on the expectations of the expectations of other agents’ 
expectations, and so on, ad infinitum. This leads to intractable mathematical problems 
except under very restrictive simplifying assumptions. 
We use the concept of a switching mechanism as proposed by Brock and 
Hommes (1997) based on a multinomial logit setup. Such a mechanism consists of 
making the weights of the simple rules a function of the relative profitability of these 
rules, i.e.: 
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6
 Indirectly, chartists do follow what other agents do because it is more profitable to be chartists the 
more chartists there are in the market. However, the expected level of return is the decision variable, 
not the number of chartists. 
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which yields, after rewriting 
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=
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where wi,t is the fraction of agents of type i in period t and i,t is the profit of strategy i. 
The parameter  measures the intensity of choice, the speed with which the technical 
traders (chartists) and fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. This parameter 
measures the “status-quo bias” in the decision to switch to the more profitable rule 
(Kahneman et al., 1991); with  equal to zero agents are insensitive to the relative 
profitability of the rules, and are distributed evenly across strategies. On the other 
hand, with increasing  agents react more strongly to the relative profitability of the 
rules. In the limiting neo-classical case when  goes to infinity all agents react 
immediately to a difference in profitability, i.e. all choose the forecasting rule which 
proved to be more profitable in the previous period. 
Brock and Hommes (1997) define profitability to be the total earnings (profits) 
on the optimal foreign asset holding. We define the profitability as the one-period 
excess return from investing in the foreign asset, multiplied by the optimal demand 
for the foreign asset. More formally, 
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 We have chosen for this setup because it is the most appropriate alternative. If 
we use utility instead of return, the performance is dependent on wealth. This is 
undesirable because traders are interested in the contemporaneous forecasting power 
of rules, not on past performance. Using only the one-period return is also less 
appropriate since this setup does not incorporate absolute differences in the magnitude 
of expectations, only the expected directions of change. 
 
 
 
 - 11 - 
1.3. The forecasting strategies 
 
 The functional form of the expectation formation rules can be adapted such 
that it fits the data best. The problem is that agents can use an infinite number of 
different rules; rationality can only take one form while bounded rationality can take 
infinitely different forms. The switching mechanism, however, works as a disciplining 
mechanism of the model; it prevents the modeler from inserting unrealistic forecasting 
strategies or strategies that are not being used. The weight of these strategies would go 
to zero, as the rules are not actually being used. Several different forms of 
expectations formation mechanisms have been uncovered over the years. In short, the 
expectation formation process can take different functional forms, depending on 
forecast horizon, sample period, and foreign exchange markets (see Allen and Taylor, 
1992; Boswijk et al., (2006); Cavaglia et al., 1993; Frankel and Froot, 1987). We 
assume that there are three types of agents: Fundamentalists who condition their 
expectation on a comparison between the market and the fundamental rate and two 
chartists (technical traders) groups who condition their expectation on past exchange 
rate movements.  
The fundamentalists condition their expectation on the difference between the 
market exchange rate and the central parity. Thus, the forecasting rule for the 
fundamentalists is 
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−−+ −=∆
n
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1 )()( ψ ,                (10) 
 
 where st* is the fundamental exchange rate in period t-1 and kψ  the speed of 
adjustment parameter.7,8 This is a generalization of the fundamentalist rule proposed 
in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006); they assume >−∈< 0,1kψ such that 
fundamentalists provide a mean reverting dynamics. We do not assume this because it 
is unknown on forehand what the effect of fundamentalists will be in our market. 
                                                
7
 Note that the expected future return depends on the previous misalignment and is not dependent on 
the current misalignment. The current exchange rate is formed by expectations of the future exchange 
rate, as comes clear from Equation 6. Therefore, the expected exchange rate cannot be a function of the 
current exchange rate, because this would render the equation unsolvable. 
8
 De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) introduce information costs in the expectation formation for 
fundamentalists. However, because our “fundamental”, the parity, is freely visible for all agents, we 
assume these costs to be zero. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that exchange rates are mean reverting in the long run 
(see e.g. Mark, 1995). Therefore, agents have the opportunity to condition 
expectations on a high(er) number of lags.  
The second group of agents in our model is technical analyst or chartist, using 
the serial correlation in the returns. Their forecasting rule is specified as 
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 where the chartists’ expectation depends on the value of the parameter . With 
-1<  < 0 chartist expectations are stabilizing because agents expect a (partial) 
reversion of previous periods return. If  > 0 on the other hand, chartists have 
bandwagon expectations pushing the exchange rate constantly in a certain direction. 
 The first two groups are similar to those defined in De Grauwe and Grimaldi 
(2005, 2006); this is standard in the literature. We introduce a third group in order to 
generalize the model. The third group also uses a chartist strategy, based on the 
difference between the short term and long term moving average. Brock et al. (1992) 
introduces this strategy and demonstrate its relevance in financial markets; see also 
Chiarella et al. (2006) for the deterministic behavior of this rule in a heterogeneous 
agents setting. The forecasting rule is given by 
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 where MAi,t and MAj,t are the i and j months moving average of the level of the 
exchange rate, i > j. The strategy works destabilizing if k > 0 as agents expect short 
run deviations from the long-term trend to persist; if k < 0 the rule is stabilizing as 
agents expect the exchange rate to return to its long run moving average. 
 
 
2. The empirical estimation of the model 
 
 The heterogeneous agent model described in Section 1 needs some 
adjustments before it can be estimated empirically. Furthermore, the target-zone 
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character of our data sample demands some further adjustments to the model. The 
fundamental exchange rate in a simulation setup can be put equal to zero, such that it 
is possible to use the absolute difference between the exchange rate and the 
fundamental rate when simulating the model. However, the fundamental rate is not 
equal to zero in our setup, so we replace the misalignment (st-st*) by (st-st*)/st*, 
representing the misalignment in percentages. Because the exchange rate is non-
stationary as a result of the realignments, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates can be 
biased. For this reason, we replace the levels of the exchange rate in equation (6) with 
the percentage changes of the exchange rate. Next to the issue of non-stationarity, we 
encounter an endogeneity problem as the exchange rate return affects the 
misalignment whereas the misalignment affects the exchange rate return.9 In order to 
handle this issue, we use a two-stage least square (2SLS) setup. We therefore 
instrument the misalignment by the foreign exchange reserves of the home country, 
the realignments in the central parity and past values of the misalignment. Test results 
indicate that the endogeneity problem is solved with the instrumented variable. 
For all three strategies, we assume that agents run a simple regression in order 
to obtain the optimal lags, in the sense of forecasting ability, for the misalignment, 
auto regressions, and moving averages.10 Because we want to verify whether the 
strategy of agents is conditional on the position of the exchange rate in the target 
zone, we add the absolute misalignment times the decision variable to the expectation 
formation functions in Equations (10)-(12). We can write the forecasting rule for the 
fundamentalists as follows: 
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 with k and l the two optimal lags obtained from the exploratory regression by 
agents; bt-i the maximum bandwidth (in percentages) of the target zone and 
1
1
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r . The second part of the second term on the right hand side thus 
                                                
9
 The Haussman test indicates a highly significant endogeneity problem and the correlation between the 
misalignment and the residuals is significant. 
10
 Agents are assumed to use two different lags. See the appendix for the optimal lag structure used by 
the agents. 
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represents the current position of the exchange rate in the target zone vis-à-vis the 
maximum bandwidth (in percentages). The first coefficient, i,1ψ , represents the direct 
effect of the misalignment on the expectation of fundamentalists, as in De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006); i,2ψ  represents the effect the position of the exchange rate 
in the band on the expectation. If 0,1
,2,1 <<− ii ψψ , fundamentalists are mean 
reverting, which becomes stronger as the exchange rate moves towards the upper or 
lower band. For both chartist strategies we also add the interaction term; the AR-
chartist forecasting rule becomes 
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and the MA-chartist forecasting rule becomes 
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Equations (6), (8) and (9) together with the functional forms of the expectation 
formation mechanisms described in equations (13)-(15) can be combined to a single 
equation-framework and be estimated by non-linear least squares.11 
Our database contains monthly bilateral exchange rates for currencies of 
countries that became EMS member in March 1979. For a number of years, prior to 
the formal adherence to the EMS, the Spanish peseta was informally kept within a +/- 
6 percent band with respect to EMS currencies. The exchange rate data were obtained 
from Datastream. Even though daily and weekly rates are available, we choose to 
employ monthly data in order to avoid issues surrounding short-term noise such as the 
day-of-the-week effect with regard to exchange rate volatility (on which, see Hsieh, 
1988). The interest rate series are call-money rates, which are largely provided by 
Datastream and the International Statistical Yearbook 2001.12 Our sample includes 
                                                
11
 For an application of the estimation procedure see Boswijk et al. (2006). 
12
 Experiments with long-term government bond yields did not affect our empirical results. 
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238 monthly observations, ranging from March 1979 through December 1998, 
marking the introduction of the Euro13. The conditional variance of the exchange rate 
returns, obtained from a GARCH(1,1) estimation procedure, is used for the variance of 
the exchange rate 2tσ . 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Our first step consists of estimating the model without switching mechanism, so with 
constant fractions, such that the model becomes linear in the expectation formation 
functions of the three groups. The model simplifies to Equation (6), with wi,t=1/3 i∀ , 
and the expectation formation functions in Equations (13), (14) and (15). The reason 
is that we first want to verify whether there is indeed significant evidence of 
heterogeneity on the foreign exchange market, before determining whether agents are 
switching between expectation formation techniques as well. Heterogeneity is defined 
as the contemporaneous presence of different expectation formation techniques in the 
market, i.e. one or more significant coefficients for more than one of the expectation 
formation Equations (13), (14) and (15). For the fundamentalists and AR-chartists we 
apply two lags; for the MA-chartists one. This setup removes all autocorrelation in the 
level and second moment of the residuals. The results of the estimation of this linear 
setup of the model are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
   ______________________ 
   
     Insert Table 1 
   ______________________ 
 
 
Overall, Table 1 indicates that there is heterogeneity in the behavior of agents 
in the exchange rate market, given the contemporaneous significant existence of 
fundamentalism and one or two forms of chartism. The exchange rate returns are 
                                                
13
 Spain and Portugal entered the EMS 1990 and 1993 respectively; they were included in the analysis 
as of the date of adherence to the EMS. Italy left the system for four years in the sample; these years 
are not included in the analyses. 
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therefore affected by different beliefs concerning the future. Given the number of 
significant coefficients per group and the distribution over countries, the market 
seems to be dominated by fundamentalists and AR-chartists; MA-chartism is 
significant for only three countries in this setup. Furthermore, the general tendency 
seems to be for agents to be stabilizing, i.e. they expect either the exchange rate to 
return to the fundamental, the exchange rate to return to the long-run moving average, 
or past exchange rate returns to be reversed. Agents active on the market therefore 
seem to have a large amount of trust in the regime (the monetary authorities), as 
evidenced by the majority of negative coefficients. 
For Italy, Portugal, and Spain, we observe evidence of all three groups given 
the one or more significant coefficients for all three expectation formation techniques; 
for Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland two groups (fundamentalism and AR-
chartism) and for The Netherlands one group (AR-chartism). Fundamentalists are in 
general confident in the system in the short run given the negative 1,k and/or  2,k 
coefficients. That is, either they are directly stabilizing as 1,k<0 and thus expect a 
misalignment to be partially reversed in the next period, or they become mean-
reverting as the exchange rate moves towards the band of the target zone, so as 
 
1,k>0,  2,k<0 and |1,k|<| 2,k|. In other words, in the latter case agents expect the 
exchange rate to move away from the fundamental as the exchange rate is relatively 
close to parity, but expect the monetary authority to intervene as the exchange rate 
approaches the band of the target zone causing the exchange rate to return towards the 
central parity. In the long run, on the other hand, the signs of the fundamentalist 
coefficients 1,l and  2,l are predominantly positive, and are thus destabilizing. 
Agents expect the exchange rate to move away from the central parity in the long run 
(1,l>0) and do not expect the monetary authority to intervene, but expect the motion 
away from the central parity to accelerate as the band of the target zone approaches (
 
2,l>0). 
The MA-chartist group is generally stabilizing given the negative estimates for 
. A negative 1,i implies that agents expect a positive difference between the short 
run moving average and the long run moving average to decrease in the next period. 
A negative 2,i implies that agents expect the difference between short- and long-run 
moving averages to decrease quicker as the exchange rate moves closer to the band of 
the target zone. The i,1 and i,2 coefficients are not significantly different, implying 
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that agents look at the difference between the moving averages; they do not look at 
the moving averages individually. 
Moreover, the results of the AR-chartists are somewhat mixed concerning the 
conclusions about stabilizing/destabilizing expectations. This group is initially also 
stabilizing given the negative 1,i coefficients. A negative 1,i implies that an exchange 
rate shock is (partially) reversed in the next period. The 2,i coefficients on the other 
hand, show a mixed image. A positive (negative) 2,i implies that agents expect the 
extrapolation (reversion) of shocks to be stronger as the exchange rate moves towards 
the band of the target zone. The total effect, so 1,i+ 2,i, is positive for four countries 
and negative for four countries in both the short and the long run. 
Boswijk et al. (2006) find significant evidence of two groups in the S&P500 
returns; fundamentalists, who expect mean reversion to the fundamental rate, and 
trend followers, who expect the deviation of the market price from the fundamental 
price to increase14. The fact that we do not find destabilizing, or trend-following, 
behavior can be explained by the target-zone character of our sample; mean reversion 
in the EMS exchange rate is also found by Ball and Roma (1993), who estimate a 
jump-diffusion model, and by Anthony and MacDonald (1999), who use cointegration 
techniques. The model fit in terms of adjusted R2 is somewhat lower in our case 
compared to Boswijk et al. (2006); 0.273 to 0.824 versus 0.77 to 0.82. This can be 
explained by the fact that Boswijk et al. (2006) use yearly stock-market data 
compared to our monthly exchange rate data; both the lower frequency data and the 
other market usually yield a better fit. 
In the next step of the analysis, we estimate the model including the switching 
mechanism defined by Equations (8) and (9). Table 2 gives the estimation results for 
the setup of the model with switching mechanism for the eight EMS countries15. 
 
   _______________________ 
 
    Insert Table 2 
   _______________________ 
                                                
14
 Boswijk et al. (2006) rewrite the model in terms of the current Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio in deviation 
from the fundamental P/E ratio. It is assumed that both groups base their expectation on this deviation, 
while in our model expectations are based on different sources of information (i.e., deviation from the 
fundamental, AR-terms and MA-terms). 
15
 Experiments with different forecasting rules for both the fundamentalists and chartists (adaptive and 
static expectations) and different profit-functions (mean square error, lagged profits) do not alter the 
results significantly. 
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Overall, the intensity of choice parameter * is not significantly different from 
zero, which implies that agents do not change their expectation formation strategy 
through time, irrespective of its forecasting performance relative to alternative 
strategies. There are, however, three issues that potentially affect this result. First, the 
switching parameter  itself is not identified in the estimation procedure16; what is 
estimated, is µγγ /* = . The estimated intensity of choice is biased towards zero if 
agents are risk-averse (>1); also, given that two coefficients are estimated, the 
variance of the estimate of * is biased upwards. Both these effects might contribute to 
the fact that * is not found to be significantly different from zero. Second, large 
changes in * do not have a large effect on the weights wi,t because of the setup of the 
switching mechanism (Eq. 8). Terasvirta (1994), however, suggests that this effect is 
not relevant; significant heterogeneity in the regimes is a necessary condition. The 
third explanation could be the fact that all types of agents use the realized exchange 
rate returns to optimize the lag structure of their forecasting function. As a result, the 
profit differences might be relatively small, causing a low number of switches 
between strategies. Our results are directly comparable to the results of Boswijk et al. 
(2006), who also report insignificant estimates for the switching parameter. 
For two countries, The Netherlands and Italy, we do find significant estimates 
for *. Both coefficients are positive, which means that agents move away from 
strategies that are relatively profitable in period t17 because they have learned that a 
certain strategy will not be profitable in consecutive periods. The size of the switching 
parameters is relatively small18, implying that agents only switch between strategies if 
the profit difference is large. 
Generally, the signs and magnitudes of the ,  and  coefficients in Table 2 
are comparable to the no-switching case in Table 1. Large, but not significant, 
changes only occur in cases in which the estimates are non-significant. In total, ten 
more coefficients are significant in the switching case compared to the non-switching 
setup. The expectation formation rules therefore fit the data better when the weight 
put on these rules is not constant through time. 
                                                
16
 Note that  is not identified in the estimation. Focusing on the denominator of Equation (8), 
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 Or that  and  are both negative. However, a negative risk aversion is highly unlikely. 
18
 The switching parameter is usually set around one in simulations (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). 
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We observe that the R2’s are higher in seven cases; likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that these differences are significant. The results indicate that the linearity 
assumption, i.e. constant fractions, is too rigid and that the switching mechanism is 
indeed beneficial in explaining movements in the returns. The switching of agents 
between strategies is therefore present in the data. This shows not only from the 
higher R2, but also from the higher number of significant coefficients. In other words, 
although we do not find significant estimates for *, including the switching 
mechanism does significantly improve the fit of the model. The issues noted above 
concerning the insignificance of the switching parameters therefore seem to have a 
significant effect on the results.  
 
   ______________________ 
   
     Insert Figure 1 
   ______________________ 
 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of weights of the strategies over time. Weights are 
stacked, such that they add up to unity. The figures clearly illustrate that the switching 
parameters are relatively small in general; weights hover roughly around one third and 
two thirds19. There are no large changes in the distribution of population beliefs. 
Furthermore, none of the strategies is dominant for long periods on end. We do 
observe, however, persistence in the distribution of weights; beliefs do not bounce up 
and down per month, but change gradually. This is also the result of the relatively 
high status quo bias. 
The weights in the price setting equation are relatively volatile for France and 
Portugal. For France this is the result of a relatively high *, which makes agents 
sensitive to differences in forecasting ability. The high volatility for Portugal is 
mainly the result of the volatile exchange rate itself, which causes large potential 
differences in profits between the strategies. Therefore, although traders are not 
particularly sensitive to differences in profit, large deviations in performance trigger 
shifts in beliefs. Weights for Belgium and Ireland are relatively constant; for Belgium 
this is due to a relatively small *. Ireland shows increased volatility in the weights 
around the 1993 crisis. The other countries are intermediate cases. 
                                                
19
 Recall that weights are constant and equal to 1/3 with =0.  
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The volatility in weights of the two groups in Boswijk et al. (2006) is higher 
compared to what we find; weights range from zero to one and change more rapidly. 
This is a direct result of the much higher estimates for the switching parameter (-7.54 
to -10.29). Furthermore, weights tend to be less extreme in our case because we have 
three groups; this decreases the probability of one group being dominant. De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) report that chartists are dominant (i.e. have a market share 
that exceeds 50%) in a simulation analysis of the model. Our results indicate that AR-
chartists have the highest average weight, but this does not exceed 50%. MA-chartists 
have the lowest average weight in general. Combined, however, chartists (so MA + 
AR) have a larger than 50% market share. The simulation results of De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2005, 2006) are therefore partly corroborated. Allen and Taylor (1992) 
report that over 90% of foreign exchange market traders use some form of technical 
analysis. We do not find such strong chartist dominance. 
 
  _____________________ 
 
    Insert Figure 2 
   _____________________ 
 
 
The effect of the intensity of choice parameter * is again clearly illustrated in 
Figure 2, where we present scatter plots of profit difference versus weight difference. 
In all scatters we observe that the higher the estimated *, the stronger is the S-shape. 
A strong S-shape implies that the distribution of beliefs (Y-axis) changes rapidly as 
the profit difference diverges from zero (X-axis); traders are thus more sensitive to 
profit differences. As * approaches zero, the scatter first becomes a straight sloping 
line, then a straight flat line; agents respond sluggish to a difference in performance. 
The scatters are in general downward sloping, indicating that a positive difference in 
profits between strategies results in a negative difference in weights. In other words, 
agents move away from a strategy that is profitable in period t because it is apparently 
less profitable in period t+1; this results from the positive estimate of *. 
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4. Forecasting power 
 
Next to the in-sample performance of a model, the ability of a model to forecast 
exchange rates out-of-sample is considered an important criterion of its quality. The 
most famous example is of course Meese and Rogoff (1983), who showed that the 
news models from the 1970s performed worse than a simple random walk in terms of 
root-mean-squared forecasting error. To our best knowledge, only Clarida and Taylor 
(1997) and Mark (1995) have come up with a model that is able to outperform the 
random walk in out-of-sample forecasting during a floating rate regime. Mark (1995) 
shows that the exchange rate is mean-reverting to a monetary-model based 
fundamental by applying long-horizon regressions; Clarida and Taylor (1997) propose 
a vector error correction model and demonstrate the information content of the 
forward rate.  
 Results are somewhat more promising for the EMS period because there is in 
principle more forecastability in a target-zone than a floating rate system since market 
expectations are bounded by the upper and lower bands (given that the regime is 
credible). Aroskar et al. (2004) outperform the random walk model with an error 
correction model for all cases in the pre- and post-crisis period and for half of the 
cases in the crisis period. Mizrach (1992) presents better forecasting results with a 
multivariate nearest-neighbor than the random walk for the Italian Lira; Fernandez-
Rodriguez et al. (1999) present better root-mean-squared-error performance for their 
simultaneous nearest-neighbor predictor compared to the random walk for six out of 
nine currencies. 
 In order to verify the forecasting power of our model, we employ an 
alternative method compared to the papers stated above. Common practice is to apply 
a rolling regression technique, so to first estimate the model for a sub-sample, second 
create forecasts, third re-estimate the model with one extra observation, etc. We do 
not apply a rolling regression technique, but use the set of coefficients estimated over 
the total sample for all forecasts, with which dynamic forecasts are made by iterating 
the model forward for the appropriate number of periods. The reason is twofold; first, 
given the non-linear nature, the behavior of the model, and thereby the forecasts, is 
highly dependent on the magnitude of the coefficients (see Chiarella et al., 2002). 
Therefore, if we are interested in explaining movements in the market, it is essential 
to incorporate the coefficients representative for the market at hand. This is especially 
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the case for the EMS because of the changing nature of the regime itself (realignments 
in the beginning years, stable middle period, and the crisis in the final years). Second, 
the model uses a relatively high number of coefficients, thus needs a relatively long 
sample period to be estimated properly. 
 Our method of forecasting demands more information concerning the 
coefficients, but uses less information regarding the variables compared to e.g. Meese 
and Rogoff (1983) and Mark (1995). In forecasting, we assume that the level of the 
fundamental (central parity), the bandwidth of the target zone, the interest rates, and 
the volatility remain constant, while Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Mark (1995) use 
future fundamental variables to generate forecasts. Our model thus does not use more 
information than the random walk model in this respect. Another advantage of our 
method is that forecasts can be formed over the complete sample, including the 
volatile beginning years of the EMS. This is not possible when applying the rolling 
regression technique because it needs a sufficiently large sub-sample in order to 
estimate the first set of coefficients. The comparison of forecasting ability between the 
random walk and heterogeneous agents model is therefore based on a larger number 
of observations when using our method, and can therefore be tested more rigorously. 
 The forecasting ability of the model is judged by comparing the mean absolute 
error (MAE) and mean squared error (MSE) of the forecasts formed by the 
heterogeneous agents model to those of the random walk model (i.e., no change). The 
significance of the difference in forecasting ability is tested by the Dybold and 
Mariano (1994) test statistic. The rectangular lag window is applied; with k-1 sample 
autocovariances for the k step ahead forecast error. We focus on the 1, 3, 6, and 12-
month forecast horizon for the eight countries. Table 3 presents the forecast errors 
made by the model divided by the forecast errors made by the random walk for the 
four forecast horizons and eight countries.  
 
   ______________________ 
   
     Insert Table 3 
   ______________________ 
 
 Overall, the results suggest that the heterogeneous agents model outperforms 
the random walk model in forecasting for all horizons; for the majority of countries 
both the MAE and MSE are smaller for our model than the random walk given the 
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fact that the ratios in Table 3 are smaller than unity. Furthermore, the difference in 
forecasting ability is generally highly significant; only for Italy and the longer 
horizons of Spain is the significance somewhat less.  
 For both the MAE and MSE we observe that the forecasting power of the 
model vis-à-vis the random walk generally improves as the forecasting horizon 
increases up to six months, while it decreases again for the twelve months horizon; the 
ratios for the three (six) months horizon are smaller than the one (three) months 
horizon, and larger for the twelve months horizon than the six months horizon. This 
can be explained by the fact that the mean reversion of the exchange rate to the central 
parity creates a growing forecast error for the random walk as the forecast horizon 
increases, while it is incorporated in the heterogeneous agents model by the stabilizing 
expectations of the three groups. The change in this trend for the twelve months 
horizon could be due to the fact that realignments in the central parity are not 
incorporated in the forecasts made by the model. For Italy and Portugal there does not 
seem to be a clear tendency over the forecast horizons, while the results for Spain 
indicate that the shorter the horizon, the better the forecasting performance. This can 
be explained by the relatively high number of realignments for the southern-European 
countries. 
 Compared to the results of Mizrach (1992), who outperforms the random walk 
for the Italian Lira, we find forecastability for a broader set of countries participating 
in the EMS; we find relatively week results for the Italian Lira. Our results are 
directly in line with those of Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (1999): significant 
outperformance of the random walk for the Belgian Franc, Danish Kroner, French 
Franc, Dutch Guilder, Irish Punt and Italian Lira, underperformance versus the 
random walk for the Portuguese Escudo and no significant results for the Spanish 
Peseta20. Aroskar et al. (2004) split their sample in a precrisis, crisis and postcrisis 
sample, while we only consider the total sample. However, we do corroborate their 
results for the pre- and postcrisis periods and show better results than the crisisperiod 
(which is also incorporated in our sample). 
 
 
 
                                                
20
 Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (1999) also include the British Pound Sterling in their analysis and find 
significant underperformance of their model versus the random walk forecast. 
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5. Stability 
 
The literature on heterogeneous agents models has been concerned with two main 
objectives. First, to try to replicate the stylized facts of financial markets such as 
heavy tails, volatility clustering, excess kurtosis by simulation techniques, see e.g. De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006), Lux (1998), Lux and Marchesi (2000). The 
second objective is to derive analytically the deterministic behavior in terms of local 
stability or instability of the nonlinear dynamic models involved, see De Grauwe et al. 
(2004), Chiarella and He (2002), and Chiarella et al. (2002).  
 In this Section, we study the deterministic behavior of our model. More 
specifically, we investigate the stability and type of limit behavior of the model if we 
iterate the model forward, using the estimated set of coefficients. Figure 3 displays the 
limit behavior of the model for seven countries21, after iterating the model forward 
until convergence using the estimated coefficients for the total sample period. 
 
   _______________________ 
  
     Insert Figure 3 
   _______________________ 
 
 
The majority of the countries converges to either a stable point or a stable 
limit cycle. Economically this implies that the target zone does not collapse, even 
without active central bank policy22; exchange rates do not diverge from the parity 
rate. The mean-reverting effect of the expectation formation strategies keeps the 
exchange rate within bands. The monetary authorities have shaped expectations in 
such a way in the 1974-1998 period such that the market controls itself afterwards. 
The model converges to a stable equilibrium for France, given that the model 
converges to a fixed point. The exchange rate returns for Denmark, Portugal, and 
Spain are not on a sustainable path, the returns explode after forward iteration. Spain 
explodes within a small number of periods, but for Portugal and Denmark we see a 
relatively calm beginning, followed by one extreme negative for Portugal and 
followed by an explosive oscillative pattern for Denmark. For Spain and Portugal, 
                                                
21
 The eighth country, Spain, explodes after two iterations 
22
 Influence of the monetary authority is zero in the simulation; both parity and band remain constant 
and there are no interventions. 
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this can be explained by the relative short in-sample period and the volatile exchange 
rate. For Denmark, however, with a stable exchange rate, the explosive behavior is 
completely the result of the nonlinear nature of the model; the explosive oscillations 
can occur as AR-chartists become dominant. The Belgian exchange rate becomes a 
two-period limit cycle; the Dutch exchange rate becomes a 19-period limit cycle; the 
Italian a 21-period cycle, and Ireland a 89 months cycle. 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) present the sensitivity of the model to 
different coefficients. Especially the intensity of choice  and the extrapolation 
parameter of AR-chartists appear to be of great importance for the limit behavior of 
their model. We corroborate their findings given the fact that the countries that 
exhibit explosive behavior all have relatively high (absolute) estimates for the AR-
chartist extrapolation parameters ; a value of ||>1 is explosive by definition. 
 Given that the exchange rates in the EMS show different periods, like the 
turbulent beginning years characterized by a high number of realignments; the stable 
middle part, and the turmoil in 1992 and 1993, it is interesting to look at the limit 
behavior of the model in sub samples, so using sets of coefficients estimated from sub 
samples. For this purpose, we estimate the model for a rolling window of one hundred 
observations23, and check whether the limit behavior of the model for a certain 
country changes over time. 
 The characterizations of the limit cycles of the sub samples are presented in 
Table A1 of the Appendix. The stability of the deterministic system follows more or 
less the stability of the EMS itself. In the beginning years, we find a relatively high 
number of non-stable limits, so either explosive limits or highly complex cycles. The 
middle years of the EMS give a relatively high number of stable limit cycles and fixed 
points attractors. Around the 1992/1993 crisis, the number of unstable and explosive 
limits rises again. The changing limit behavior is an indication that expectation 
formation and investor behavior is not constant through time. 
   _______________________ 
 
    Insert Figure 4 
   _______________________ 
 
                                                
23
 The first sub sample is thus 1979M03 – 1987M12, the second 1979M04 – 1988M01 etc. Spain and 
Portugal are omitted because of lack of observations. 
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 Figure 4 depicts some examples of the (complex) limit cycles we found. It is 
an illustration of the complex behavior that the simple model is capable of producing. 
In addition, it illustrates how the behavior of one single model can change 
dramatically when the coefficients change; different starting values or coefficient 
values have a much larger impact on this non-linear dynamic model than a standard 
e.g. monetary model24. It is a real-life example of the sensitivity analyses with respect 
to the coefficients as is done in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). Outcomes of 
the model can differ significantly in reaction to a similar exogenous shock when 
coefficients are marginally different. Furthermore, even though the model produces a 
stable limit in most cases, this does not mean that this limit is reached in the same 
number of periods. As also comes clear from Figure 4, stability can be reached after a 
positive or negative swing, or stabilizing oscillations; in some occasions, it took the 
model more than ten thousands periods to converge to a stable equilibrium. Therefore, 
even if a number of sets of coefficients give a similar limit, short term dynamics can 
differ dramatically. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we explored the relevance of the heterogeneity of agents’ expectations, 
who use incomplete information and who have different beliefs about the future 
exchange rate. In particular, we extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2006) by 
estimating the heterogeneous agent model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) 
for the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates. By using the central 
‘parity’ rate as the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the EMS-period, from 
March 1979 until December 1998. 
 The empirical results suggest that there is heterogeneity in the behavior of 
agents in the EMS exchange rate market, given the contemporaneous significant 
existence of fundamentalism and one or two forms of chartism. Exchange rate returns 
are therefore affected by different beliefs concerning the future. One type of agents  
conditions its decisions on the distance to the central parity and two other types of 
agents condition their decision on past returns (based on auto regression and moving 
                                                
24
 In linear models starting values are no issue at all. 
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average). All groups have mean-reverting beliefs, so the fundamentalists expect the 
misalignment to decrease in the next period, AR-chartists expect a given period’s 
return to be partially reversed the next period, and MA-chartists expect the exchange 
rate to return to its long run moving average. The coefficient governing the switching 
of believes is significant in two out of eight cases, but the model with switching 
mechanism does perform significantly better than the model without switching 
mechanism. Therefore, although the intensity of choice is not significantly different 
from zero in estimation, there are clues that agents switch between forecasting 
strategies. Moreover, all results are robust to the country and the functional forms of 
the expectation formation rules and the profit function. 
 The empirical relevance of the model is further demonstrated by its forecasting 
ability. Our estimation results show that the heterogeneous agent model outperforms 
the random walk model in forecasting future exchange rate returns in practically all 
the country/horizon combinations. Finally, we find that the limit behavior of the 
model for the total sample is generally stable, while it differs considerably per country 
and period for sub samples. 
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Appendix 
 
 
     Table A1: Optimal lags 
 Fundamentalist AR MA 
 k l k
 
l i j 
Belgium 2 3 1 12 4 5 
Denmark 1 2 1 2 7 8 
France 3 4 8 9 9 10 
Netherlands 1 20 13 16 9 10 
Ireland 2 19 1 20 8 9 
Italy 2 4 2 7 8 10 
Portugal 3 9 2 16 2 3 
Spain 1 10 8 10 1 2 
Notes: Table A1 depicts the lags that optimize the forecasting power of the three 
individual strategies, as used in the estimation procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Limit Behavior 
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Notes: Table A2 characterizes the limit behavior of the model with the estimated coefficients for the given sub-periods. The numbers denote 
the number of points of the limit cycle; F denotes a fixed-point attractor; C denotes complex behavior (i.e. non-stable, non-explosive behavior); 
and E denotes explosive behavior. 
 
Table 1: Estimation Results (no switching) 
 
 Be De Fr Nl It Ir Po Sp 
1,k 0.729*** 0.503 -1.049*** -0.371 -1.094*** -0.031 0.460* 1.390*** 
 (0.280) (0.426) (0.336) (0.419) (0.234) (0.142) (0.251) (0.495) 

 2,k -0.956*** -0.276 -0.064 -0.950 0.397 -0.379*** -1.661** -4.592*** 
 (0.137) (0.192) (0.125) (0.807) (0.285) (0.086) (0.650) (1.012) 
1,l -1.321*** -0.569 0.672* 0.013 0.928*** -0.274 -1.661** 0.171 
 (0.287) (0.423) (0.333) (0.312) (0.194) (0.206) (0.650) (0.362) 

 2,l 0.594*** -0.529** 0.080 0.531 -0.285** 0.072 1.753*** 0.659 
 (0.168) (0.214) (0.121) (0.524) (0.136) (0.075) (0.534) (0.553) 
         
1,1 -0.033 -0.402 -0.211 -0.123 0.003*** 1.799 0.045** -0.012 
 (0.046) (0.342) (0.514) (2.025) (0.001) (3.761) (0.020) (0.009) 
1,2 -0.030 -0.399 -0.211 -0.123 0.003*** 1.863 0.050** -0.011 
 (0.046) (0.340) (0.514) (2.014) (0.001) (3.768) (0.019) (0.009) 
2,1 -0.033 0.315 0.606 -14.732 -0.003*** -1.862 -0.598*** -0.050** 
 (0.084) (0.659) (0.419) (9.522) (0.001) (9.697) (0.090) (0.021) 
2,1 -0.033 0.314 0.607 -14.731 -0.003*** -1.886 -0.598*** -0.049** 
 (0.084) (0.660) (0.420) (9.523) (0.001) (9.708) (0.090) (0.020) 
         
1,k -0.748*** 0.477* 0.333 -0.690** -0.686*** 0.431 -0.218 -0.684** 
 (0.259) (0.269) (0.325) (0.306) (0.258) (0.280) (0.714) (0.324) 
2,k 0.426* -1.208*** -0.036 2.235*** 0.410** -0.711*** 17.227*** 1.483** 
 (0.236) (0.320) (0.164) (0.670) (0.198) (0.203) (2.508) (0.567) 
1,l 0.308 -0.908* -0.293 -0.029 -0.155 -0.904*** 0.392 -0.452 
 (0.226) (0.467) (0.330) (0.295) (0.277) (0.319) (0.295) (0.350) 
2,l 0.026 0.180 0.331** 0.132 -0.252** 0.214 -1.813 3.106*** 
 (0.142) (0.359) (0.166) (0.676) (0.116) (0.162) (1.238) (0.668) 
         
R2 0.477 0.320 0.335 0.273 0.282 0.314 0.824 0.535 
Notes: Table 1 presents the estimation results of the model formed by Equations (6), (13), (14) and (15). The ’s 
represent the coefficients for fundamentalism;  for MA-chartism and  for AR-chartism. Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the 
direct and position dependent effect, respectively; k and l represent the optimal lags (see the Appendix). Standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. R2 is the adjusted r-
squared. Be denotes Belgium; De Denmark; Fr France; Nl Netherlands; It Italy; Ir Ireland; Po Portugal and Sp Spain. 
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Table 2: Estimation Results (with switching) 
 
 Be De Fr Nl It Ir Po Sp 
1,k 0.715** 0.346 -0.372** -0.415 -1.002*** -0.062 0.441*** 0.561*** 
 (0.282) (0.413) (0.173) (0.339) (0.167) (0.132) (0.096) (0.203) 
2,k -0.952*** -0.446*** -0.201*** -0.498 0.592*** -0.288*** -2.667*** -1.551*** 
 (0.138) (0.160) (0.061) (0.832) (0.111) (0.081) (0.234) (0.261) 
1,l -1.302*** -0.608 0.341** -0.211 0.862*** -0.241 -0.120 0.103 
 (0.290) (0.418) (0.160) (0.289) (0.155) (0.193) (0.102) (0.261) 

 2,l 0.591*** -0.011 0.162*** 1.414** -0.227* 0.060 -1.030*** 0.519 
 (0.169) (0.220) (0.058) (0.567) (0.118) (0.071) (0.313) (0.549) 
         
1,1 -0.034 -0.254 0.009 -0.621 0.003*** 4.415 0.026*** -0.024*** 
 (0.046) (0.349) (0.122) (1.921) (0.001) (3.797) (0.007) (0.006) 
1,2 -0.031 -0.254 0.009 -0.620 0.003*** 4.468 0.026*** -0.023*** 
 (0.046) (0.348) (0.123) (1.921) (0.001) (3.803) (0.007) (0.006) 
2,1 -0.028 0.052 -0.044 -5.105 -0.003*** -8.413 -0.256*** 0.028** 
 (0.085) (0.793) (0.427) (8.919) (0.001) (9.687) (0.051) (0.012) 
2,1 -0.028 0.054 -0.045 -5.113 -0.004*** -8.447 -0.256*** 0.028** 
 (0.085) (0.794) (0.428) (8.919) (0.001) (9.698) (0.051) (0.012) 
         
1,k -0.734*** 0.444* -0.253*** -0.604*** -0.478** 0.271 0.710*** -0.606** 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.075) (0.216) (0.223) (0.267) (0.118) (0.233) 
2,k 0.432* -1.481*** 0.096** 1.905*** 0.508*** -0.275* -1.579*** 1.520*** 
 (0.236) (0.429) (0.038) (0.483) (0.115) (0.169) (0.479) (0.355) 
1,l 0.308 -0.278 -0.403*** -0.363** -0.003 -0.877*** 0.246 -0.140 
 (0.226) (0.414) (0.118) (0.183) (0.230) (0.306) (0.193) (0.194) 
2,l 0.029 -0.259 0.410*** 0.358 -0.299*** 0.205 3.785*** 1.648*** 
 (0.142) (0.416) (0.059) (0.483) (0.101) (0.158) (1.168) (0.471) 
         
* 2.92E-05 0.009 -3.776 0.344** 7.75E-05*** 0.027 0.147 0.004 
 (4.27E-05) (0.006) (4.011) (0.157) (2.85E-05) (0.019) (0.237) (0.002) 
         
R2 0.446 0.344 0.483 0.295 0.428 0.344 0.853 0.636 
Notes: Table 2 presents the estimation results of the model formed by Equations (6), (13), (14) and (15). The ’s represent 
the coefficients for fundamentalism;  for MA-chartism and  for AR-chartism. *=/ represents the switching parameter. 
Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the direct and position dependent effect, respectively; k and l represent the optimal lags (see the 
Appendix). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
R2 is the adjusted r-squared. Be denotes Belgium; De Denmark; Fr France; Nl Netherlands; It Italy; Ir Ireland; Po Portugal 
and Sp Spain. 
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Table 3: Forecasting power 
 
  1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 
Be MAE 0.976 0.830** 0.777*** 0.799*** 
 MSE 0.565*** 0.419*** 0.409*** 0.596*** 
      
Dk MAE 0.917*** 0.856*** 0.275*** 0.718*** 
 MSE 0.675*** 0.591*** 0.544*** 0.553*** 
      
Fr MAE 0.906 0.777*** 0.747*** 0.787*** 
 MSE 0.557*** 0.464*** 0.516*** 0.617*** 
      
Nl MAE 0.956*** 0.859*** 0.810*** 0.868*** 
 MSE 0.703*** 0.477*** 0.475*** 0.663*** 
      
Ir MAE 0.939 0.850*** 0.764*** 0.756*** 
 MSE 0.639*** 0.581*** 0.582*** 0.586*** 
      
It MAE 0.994 0.897* 0.932 0.923 
 MSE 0.731** 0.587** 0.832 1.580** 
      
Po MAE 1.668*** 1.652*** 1.777*** 1.022 
 MSE 4.375*** 4.631*** 5.131*** 1.617*** 
      
Sp MAE 0.668*** 0.832*** 0.975 1.043 
 MSE 0.338*** 0.575*** 0.821** 0.885 
Notes: Table 3 presents the ratios between the forecast errors made by the model versus the 
random walk, i.e. a value larger (smaller) than one indicates a better forecasting performance 
for the random walk (model). *, **, *** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
difference in forecasting performance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively by the Dybold-
Mariano test statistic. MAE denotes Mean Absolute Error; MSE Mean Squared error. Be 
represents Belgium; De Denmark; Fr France; Nl Netherlands; It Italy; Ir Ireland; Po Portugal 
and Sp Spain. 
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Figure 1: Weights 
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Notes: Figure 1 depicts the 
fundamentalist W_F(t), MA-chartist 
W_MA(t), and AR-chartist W_RA(t) 
weights through time, as estimated by 
the model. The weights of the groups 
are stacked, such that the upper line is 
equal to one and distances between the 
lines represent weights. Note that the 
weights in the figure are the 12-month 
moving averages of monthly weights. 
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Figure 2: Profit difference versus weight difference 
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Notes: Figure 2 displays scatter plots 
of the difference in profit
tjti ,, pipi −  
(horizontal axis) and the difference in 
weight 
tjti ww ,, −  (vertical axis), for all 
three possible combinations of 
strategies 
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Figure 3: Simulated Returns 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 5 depicts simulations of the model for 
seven countries (Spain explodes within two periods), 
using the coefficients as they are estimated for the 
total sample. The second plots for Netherlands, Italy, 
and Ireland are close-ups of the limit behavior. 
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Denmark, 7/81 - 4/90, Lev el France, 5/81 - 2/90, Lev el
Netherlands, 12/85 - 9/94, Lev el
Italy , 4/81 - 1/90, Lev el Ireland, 8/85 - 5/94, Lev el
Denmark, 7/81 - 4/90, Phase-plot
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Figure 4: Limit cycles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 6 depicts some examples of higher-order limit cycles and phase plots simulated by the model with 
coefficients estimated from sub samples. The dates under the figures indicate the sub sample over which the coefficients are 
estimated. 
 
